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1   Beyond Promotion-Based Store Switching:  




In this paper, we demonstrate that single-purpose multiple store shopping is not only driven by 
opportunistic, promotion-based motivations, but may also be part of a longer term shopping planning 
process based on stable store characteristics. We find that consumers may systematically visit 
multiple stores to take advantage of two types of store complementarity. In the case of ‘fixed cost 
complementarity’, consumers alternate visits to high and low fixed cost stores to balance transaction 
and holding costs against acquisition costs. ‘Category preference complementarity’ occurs when 
different stores offer the best value for different product categories. Tying these multiple store 
shopping motivations to characteristics of grocery stores leads to interesting new insights into the 
nature of spatial retail competition.   
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2   1. Introduction 
 
One of the most important trends characterizing today’s grocery retail business is the massive rise 
in multiple store patronage (Kahn & McAlister, 1997). Rather than passively revisiting the same store 
– out of habit or due to an aversion to change - consumers actively exploit the opportunities offered 
by a differentiated retail environment by visiting two or more stores on a regular basis. In fact, strictly 
store loyal consumers have become the exception rather than the rule. A recent survey by Progressive 
Grocer (2004) indicates, for instance, that 75% of all grocery shoppers regularly visits more than one 
store each week (Stassen, Mittelstaedt & Mittelstaedt, 1999). Similar figures are reported in Drèze 
and Vanhuele (2003) and Fox and Hoch (2004).  
The marketing literature has typically viewed grocery store switching as evidence of opportunistic 
cherry picking behavior, consumers switching stores to benefit from temporary promotional offers 
(Lal & Rao, 1997; Bell & Lattin, 1998; Drèze, 1999; Fox & Hoch, 2004). There is a growing belief, 
however, that multiple store shopping cannot be ascribed to price promotions alone (Popkowski-
Leszczyc & Timmermans, 1997; Krider & Weinberg, 2000). First, the stability and regularity of 
multiple store shopping patterns reported in recent papers does not fit in with the picture of cherry 
picking consumers selecting stores on the basis of temporary ‘best deals’ (Galata, Bucklin & 
Hanssens, 1999; Rhee & Bell, 2002). Second, the fraction of consumers who decide where to shop on 
the basis of feature ads is found to lie in the 10-35% range (Urbany, Dickson & Kalapurakal, 1996; 
FMI 1993)- far below the fraction of shoppers who regularly visit multiple stores (about 75%, see 
above). Empirical evidence that sales promotions induce store switching and enhance store sales also 
remains limited (Rhee & Bell, 2002; Srinivasan, Pauwels, Hanssens & Dekimpe, 2004)
1. This 
suggests that consumers may systematically visit multiple stores for reasons other than promotional 
offers. 
                                                 
1 One possible explanation is that consumers select a set of stores based on the expected basket price (including promotions) and then visit 
these stores repeatedly, (re)allocating their actual purchases over these stores at a given point in time depending on deals available at that 
time. Even so, this explanation would require consumers to figure out what is on deal in each store prior to shopping, and should lead to 
promotion-based shifts in category sales across stores. 
3   In this paper, we study non-promotional motives for multiple store shopping. To improve our 
understanding of systematic multiple store shopping (MSS) and its implications, we develop a formal 
model of consumer shopping behavior. The model integrates insights from the marketing and 
geographical literature on shopping behavior. In addition to shopping costs, we explicitly account for 
differences in fixed and variable shopping benefits between different stores. Next, we do not only 
concentrate on store choice decisions but also incorporate related shopping decisions, such as 
shopping frequency, shopping trip organization, and category allocation decisions.  
Our paper contributes to the available literature in several ways. We offer two main substantive 
insights. First, we show that, even in the absence of temporary promotional offers, consumers may 
have good reasons to patronize more than one grocery store. More specifically, we demonstrate that 
consumers may systematically allocate their purchases over two or more stores to take advantage of 
two types of store complementarity: (i) fixed cost complementarity (stores with the lowest fixed costs 
- such as transportation and in-store costs – have higher variable costs) and/or (ii) category preference 
complementarity (one store is preferred for a subset of categories, another store for the remaining 
categories). Second, we link consumers’ motives for visiting multiple stores with their shopping trip 
organization, i.e., whether different stores are visited on the same or separate shopping trips. This, in 
turn, will affect how category purchases are allocated across stores. 
From a managerial perspective, we shed new light on the nature of spatial competition between 
retail chains. Based on estimated shopping cost functions obtained from a scanner panel data set, we 
derive the spatial distribution of consumers’ optimal (single or multiple store) shopping patterns for 
various competing store chains. We show how the type and degree of complementarity between these 
chains may lead to distinct competitive patterns: ‘Winner-Takes-All’, ‘Partial Eclipse’, or ‘Jig-Saw’ 
Competition, in which retailers either fight for the shoppers’ entire basket, or try to secure a proper 
share of their grocery spending.  
 The discussion is organized as follows. We first present a conceptual framework describing the 
shopping decision process. Building on this framework, section 3 specifies the mathematical shopping 
decision model, with its implied shopping pattern alternatives and the conditions under which they 
prevail. An empirical model is presented in section 4, and implications for retail competition are 
4   discussed in section 5. Section 6, finally, provides an overview of the major conclusions, limitations, 
and interesting areas for future research. 
 
2.  Related literature  
 
Our paper builds upon two main streams of literature: the marketing-based literature on store 
choice models, and the predominantly geographical oriented literature on multipurpose shopping and 
spatial interaction models.  
Marketing papers on store choice mostly concentrated on single purpose shopping, where 
consumers face a choice between competitive stores that offer essentially similar assortments. These 
papers model the consumer’s selection of a retail outlet at a given point in time, typically assuming 
that consumers select the store that provides the maximum shopping utility and that they will assign 
their entire shopping basket to this store (Messinger & Narasimhan, 1997; Bell, Ho & Tang , 1998). 
Within this setting, shifts in store patronage over time are especially related to changes in the 
consumer’s shopping list and other situational factors - such as promotions – that affect the 
consumers’ variable shopping costs.  
A few marketing papers have relaxed this focus on single store selection. Lal and Rao (1997) and 
Galata et al. (1999), for instance, developed predictive and normative models of how promotional 
price cuts may affect store format selections. In this framework, part of the consumers may visit 
EDLP as well as HiLo stores on a regular basis, to combine advantages of lower regular prices (EDLP 
stores) with occasionally offered, sharp promotional price cuts (HiLo stores). However, as specials are 
typically offered at random points in time, and given that empirically observed store switching effects 
are not overwhelming, additional forces must underlie systematic multiple store visits for groceries. In 
an exploratory analysis of consumers’ shopping behavior across and within retail formats, Fox, 
Montgomery and Lodish (2004) find that - besides promotions – stable store format features such as 
assortment and accessibility do affect multiple store patronage. Their results also suggest that 
consumers’ preferences for alternative formats are interrelated. Based on these findings, the authors 
5   call for research that sheds more light on the complementarity and substitutability of stores in 
different formats, accounting for consumers’ ‘higher-order shopping strategies’.  
The latter issues received widespread attention in the geographically oriented literature on multi-
purpose shopping (Ghosh & McLafferty, 1984; Ingene & Ghosh, 1990; Dellaert, Arentze, Bierlaire, 
Borgers & Timmermans, 1998). In these papers, multiple store shopping is seen as the outcome of 
shopping location choices, taking into account more than one shopping purpose or need. Often, not all 
locations can satisfy the full set of purchase needs (e.g. groceries as well as shoe repair services). In 
such cases, purchases may be systematically allocated to different shopping locations depending on 
whether other, complementary shopping tasks have to be fulfilled on the same shopping trip. For 
instance, consumers will buy their groceries on a different (often more remote) location when they 
also need to visit a shoe repair shop. Buying frequently purchased products such as groceries at 
different locations allows to reduce transportation and holding costs, and hence minimize overall 
shopping costs.  
A key question is to what extent these insights from multipurpose studies remain relevant when 
consumers have only a single purpose – buying groceries. It should be recognized that, in the above- 
mentioned papers, multiple store shopping arises because some locations only carry a subset of 
product categories. While this assumption is valid for multi-purpose shopping trips, it may not hold 
for single-purpose shopping trips. An interesting study by Krider and Weinberg (2000) indicates that a 
trade-off between fixed and variable shopping costs can also motivate consumers to visit multiple 
stores in a single purpose shopping context - where stores offer the same types of products. To reduce 
overall shopping costs, consumers may decide to buy perishable (high holding cost) products 
predominantly in nearby (possibly less preferred) stores, while fulfilling the bulge of their other 
product needs in more distant (but more preferred) stores. Yet, in Krider and Weinberg’s analysis, 
price/quality differences across chains are the same for all categories and only the effect of storage 
cost differences between categories intervenes, leaving other potential motivations for MSS 
uncovered. 
In sum, while providing relevant insights, the literature to date leaves us with a challenging 
research issue: to explore the reasons behind, and the strategic consequences of, systematic multiple 
6   store shopping in a single purpose context (grocery shopping), where consumers face a variety of 
store chains with the same categories but with different benefits and costs. 
 
3.  Single-purpose multiple-store shopping  
 
3.1. Conceptual framework 
 
 Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual framework, which extends the available literature in several 
ways. In line with Bell et al. (1998), we assume that consumers maximize overall (fixed and variable) 
shopping utility when making their shopping decisions. However, while Bell et al. (1998) focus on 
store choice, we extend their analysis by including additional shopping decisions affecting the 
attained utility level (see right panel of Figure 1):  
•  The selection of a shopping pattern, where we distinguish between the following three generic 
options
 2: 
(I)  Single Store Shopping Pattern: here, the consumer always visits the same store 
(II)  Separate Store Shopping Pattern: the consumer patronizes multiple stores, but visits 
only one store on each shopping trip. A trip refers to one displacement by a consumer 
to buy groceries, usually starting from and returning to his home. 
(III)  Combined Store Shopping Pattern: the consumer patronizes more than one store on 
each shopping trip.  
•  The selection of the specific store(s) to be visited. 
•  The determination of the number of shopping trips for each store, i.e. store specific shopping 
        frequency. 
•  The allocation of category purchases over stores. 
 
                                                 
2 In reality, stable shopping patterns may consist of a mix of these generic patterns, such as a combination of separate and combined multiple 
store shopping trips. For simplicity of exposition, the discussion below concentrates on the three ‘pure’ shopping patterns (either single, 
separate or combined visits). Similar analyses for mixed shopping patterns (consumers alternating between separate and combined visits) 
point out that the underlying motivations are a combination of those for ‘pure’ patterns, see also note 6 below. 
7   When making these decisions, consumers trade off several types of shopping benefits and costs 
(see central box in Figure 1). Based on the spatial interaction model literature (Ghosh & McLafferty, 
1984; Bawa & Ghosh, 1999), we specify the consumer’s shopping decision process as a cost 
minimization problem, and include three types of costs: (i) transaction costs or fixed shopping costs. 
These are incurred each time a shopping trip is made and consist of transportation and in-store costs. 
Transportation costs stem from the time and effort to go to the store, typically related to store 
distance. In-store costs refer to time costs of walking through the aisles and waiting at the checkout 
(ii) acquisition costs or variable shopping costs (the amount to be paid to acquire the products), and 
(iii) handling and holding costs (costs of handling and storing the products at home). 
In addition, building upon the marketing-oriented shopping studies (Tang, Bell & Ho, 2001), we 
account for variable and fixed shopping benefits: (i) consumption benefits (the utility of consuming 
the products), and (ii) fixed in-store benefits (the pleasure derived from the shopping act which, for 
instance, is enhanced by store ambience and service level, Berman & Evans, 1999).  
Given our interest in systematic multiple store shopping, we focus on equilibrium  shopping 
patterns, based on stable benefits and costs (see Krider & Weinberg 2000; Galata et al., 1999; Ghosh 
& McLafferty, 1984; Ingene & Ghosh, 1990 and Bawa & Ghosh, 1999 for a similar approach). As 
indicated in the left panel of Figure 1, the level and importance of these benefits and costs will depend 
on store characteristics (such as size, accessibility, service level), product category characteristics 
(like demand and storage cost), and the interaction between them (e.g. store differences in assortment 
quality and variety for the required categories). Concentrating on these stable shopping factors allows 
us to isolate the phenomenon of MSS. 
 
3.2. Shopping behavior model  
 
In this section we model the consumer’s shopping cost function. Let s be a store indicator, and p a 
product category indicator. Like Ghosh and McLafferty (1984), we assume that a consumer’s 
8   shopping pattern includes at most two stores (s=s1,s2)
 3. For simplicity of exposition, we also present 
our model and results for two product categories (p=p1,p2) - a condition that will be relaxed in the 
empirical section. Consistent with our focus on single-purpose shopping, we assume that each 
category can be bought in each store, thereby relaxing Ghosh and McLafferty’s assumption that one 
of the product categories can be bought in one of the stores only.  
Building on Ghosh and McLafferty’s spatial interaction model, we propose the following 
expressions for the consumer’s total shopping cost during a specified planning horizon (to avoid 
notational burden, we omit the consumer superscript): 
For shopping patterns involving a single store s1 only (pattern I): 
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where  
TC  = total shopping cost per period (i.e., the consumer’s planning horizon) 
s p, α   = fraction of category p’s demand purchased in store s  
VCp,s  = net variable shopping cost per unit for category p in store s 
Dp  = demand per period for category p 
Sp  = storage cost per unit of category p per period 
Ns (Ns1s2) = number of shopping trips per period to store s (combined trips to stores s1 and s2) 
Ns,p  = number of shopping trips per period to store s on which category p is purchased 
                                                 
3 In this expression, we assume that the consumer considers stores s1 and s2. In fact, a similar expression can be formulated for any pair of 
stores, consumers then (i) for each store pair {s1,s2}, deciding upon the best shopping pattern (optimal levels of Ns1, Ns2, Ns1s2 and αs1, αs2 
minimizing expression (1) for that pair) and (ii) comparing these ‘best patterns’ across store pairs. In the remainder of the mathematical 
derivations, we will focus on the cost expressions involving a store pair {s1,s2}. 
9   ts(ts1s2)= net fixed shopping cost per trip to store s (per combined trip to stores s1 and s2),  
       and the subscripts I, II and III refer to single, separate, and combined shopping patterns, resp.  
In each of these expressions, three cost types intervene:  
•  The first is the total net variable shopping cost over the planning period, which depends on the 
consumer’s category demand (Dp) and on how category purchases are allocated across stores (αp,s,). 
The net variable shopping cost for a unit  of category p in store s (VCp,s) is specified as the 
difference between price (Pp,s) and quality/consumption benefits (Qp,s) per unit of category p bought 
in store s.  
•  The second term captures the total holding costs over the planning period. If all category 
purchases are made in a single store s (pattern I), the average inventory level is equal to Dp/2Ns and 
the total holding cost for the category amounts to Sp * (Dp/2Ns)
 4. With combined shopping patterns 
(pattern III), all categories are still purchased during the same shopping trip, such that the holding 
cost expression remains the same as for the single store strategy. In case of separate store visits, 
however, the holding cost function becomes more complex. Specifically, when only a fraction αp,s 
of category p’s demand is purchased in store s, holding costs for these purchases have to be 
corrected for (i) the lower amount bought in store s (αp,s* Dp instead of Dp), and (ii) the fact that the 
acquired products have to be stored during only a fraction αp,s of the planning period. Like Ghosh 
and McLafferty (1984), we further rely on the assumptions that (i) customers who visit different 
stores on separate shopping trips deplete the inventory of one store’s products before making 
purchases of the same product category in a different store, and (ii) the number of store visits to one 
store is an integer multiple of the number of visits to the other. Under these assumptions, holding 
costs per category and store in the separate store shopping strategy (II) amount to α²p,s* Sp * Dp 
/2Ns,p 
5 (Ghosh & McLafferty, 1984).  
                                                 
4 Like Krider and Weinberg (2000), we specify unit holding cost as independent of purchase price. For groceries, this seems like an 
acceptable assumption, since (i) price differences between stores and (ii) financial investments in these products (absolute price levels) are 
low. Note that our Sp does vary by product category. Allowing holding costs to vary with store price differences would make the derivations 
more complex, but would not alter the essence of our findings. 
5 Unlike Ghosh and McLafferty, we use Ns,p  (the number of visits to store s on which category p was purchased) rather than Ns (total 
number of visits to store s) in the denominator of the expression. The reason is that when purchases of several categories are allocated to 
more than one store (a situation not considered by Ghosh and McLafferty), consumers must align the timing of store visits across the 
different categories, and may find it optimal not to purchase the category on each visit to the store. This will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
10   •  The third term represents the total net fixed shopping costs, specified as the number of trips (Ns) 
times the net fixed costs incurred per trip (ts). The latter is obtained by subtracting the in-store 
benefits from the transportation and in-store cost of one visit. The fixed cost of a combined trip to 
stores s1 and s2 (ts1s2) is a function of the fixed cost of a trip to each of the separate stores. Given 
that the transportation cost for a combined trip comprises the cost of a ‘one-way journey’ to s1 and 
s2 plus the cost of travelling from s1 to s2, combined shopping trips may allow to reduce 
transportation costs, especially when the distance between both stores is small.  
In brief, shopping cost functions (1a)-(1c) have three distinguishing features. First, they combine 
benefits and costs into ‘net costs’, thereby generalizing previously used cost functions in the spatial 
interaction model literature. Second, they allow for single as well as multiple store shopping in a 
single purpose (grocery) context where all categories are available in all stores. Third, in case of 
multiple store shopping, they allow for category purchases to be allocated to different stores, which 
may be visited on separate or combined shopping trips
6.  
Henceforth, we use the shorter terms ‘fixed costs’ and ‘variable costs’ to denote the net cost level 
obtained after subtraction of in-store and consumption benefits. Moreover, whenever confusion is 
possible, we use unit fixed cost to denote the fixed cost per shopping trip to a store, and total fixed 
cost to denote the fixed costs over the planning horizon. Similarly, the terms unit variable cost and 
unit holding (or storage) cost refer to the cost for one unit of a category in a store, and total variable 
cost’ and total holding cost to the costs over the entire planning period. 
3.3. Optimal shopping pattern selection 
 
                                                 
6 In principle, our model can accommodate mixed patterns, in which consumers visit multiple stores on separate and combined shopping 
trips. To illustrate this, integration of the three cost functions and replacement of αp,s1 by δp,s1 (based on the proof of result 2a below) leads to 
the following overall cost function: 
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where 
δp,s1 = indicator variable, equal to 1 if – on a combined trip to stores s1 and s2 - category p is bought in store s1, and equal to 0 if bought in 
store s2. 
αp,s1s2 = the fraction of category p’s demand per period purchased on combined shopping trips to s1 and s2. 
Values of αp,s1s2 between 0 and 1 correspond to mixed shopping strategies, in which a fraction αp,s1s2 of category purchases are made on 
combined shopping trips, and a fraction (1-αp,s1s2) on separate visits to store s1 or s2. 
11   In this section, we derive conditions under which alternative shopping patterns are optimal. We 
assume that consumers select the shopping pattern with the lowest total shopping cost as specified in 
(1). To identify this optimal shopping pattern, we first determine optimal shopping frequencies (Ns or 
Ns1s2) and optimal category allocations (αp,s) for each type of shopping pattern. We then substitute the 
resulting expressions into the total cost functions.  
Appendix 1 provides details on the derivations. The results are summarized in Table 1, which 
presents optimal store visit frequencies (first column), optimal category purchase allocations (second 
column), and minimum total costs (third column). In these ‘minimum cost’ expressions, the first term 
captures the fixed plus holding costs, while the remaining terms cover the total variable shopping 
costs. These analytical expressions for optimal costs allow us to identify under which circumstances 
different types of MSS may prevail
7. Specifically, the potential for MSS critically depends on (see 
Figure 2 for an overview):  
•  the stores’ unit fixed costs, which can be the (i) same or (ii) different  
•  the pattern of ‘category-specific store preferences’, measured as category differences in 
variable costs weighted by the inverse of holding cost (for a formal definition see Table 
2). Three possibilities arise: (i) uniform category-specific store preferences (one store 
offers the same weighted variable cost advantage over the other store for all categories), 
(ii) category preference asymmetry (one store is preferred over the other for both 
categories, but the weighted cost advantage is larger for one category than for the other), 
and (iii) category preference complementarity (one store is preferred over the other for 
one product category, the other store offers more favorable conditions for the second 
category). 
 
                                                 
7 When considering the cost expressions in detail, two points have to be made on the separate visit strategy. First, for our model to be 
meaningful, the number of shopping trips for one store must be an integer multiple of that for the other store (see Ghosh and McLafferty for 
a similar requirement) – a condition that may require deviations from the number of shopping trips in column 1. Second, the optimal 
category allocations in the second column of Table 1 are obtained for each product category independently (see Appendix 1 for details). If, 
however, these results indicate that purchases of both categories should be spread across stores (situation IIc in the table), further 
adjustments are needed to align the timing of store visits and the associated purchase allocations across categories. It follows that, for the 
separate store strategy, especially for the case where each category is adopted in both stores, the costs in Table 1 constitute a lower bound on 
the true optimal costs of the separate visit strategy. This is of no consequence for the remainder of this section, where we mainly focus on 
necessary conditions for this strategy to be optimal. In our simulation analyses in the next section, we will explicitly incorporate these 
regularity conditions when comparing cost levels across shopping strategies, as explained in Appendix 3. 
12   In the sections below, we show how these store pair characteristics determine whether single store 
shopping only (Result 1; cases 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 2), single or separate store shopping (Result 2; 
case 4 in Figure 2) or each of the three shopping patterns (Result 3; cases 5 and 6 in Figure 2) may 
prevail and discuss necessary conditions as well as underlying intuitive motivations for MSS.  
Result 1 (Single store shopping only) 
Result 1a: If stores have no category preference complementarity and the same unit fixed cost (cases 
1 and 3 in Figure 2), consumers will always prefer a single store shopping pattern. 
Proof: Let store s1 be preferred over s2 for both categories. Variable shopping costs of separate 
and combined shopping strategies can in this case never be lower than the variable shopping costs 
when only s1 is visited. Moreover, with equal unit fixed cost for both stores (t=ts1=ts2), holding plus 
fixed shopping costs when only store s1 is visited, will always be lower than  
(i)  those with separate visits to s1 and s2:   
2
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(ii) those with combined visits to s1 and s2:  
) ( 2 ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 2 , 1 2 2 1 1 p p p p s s p p p p D S D S t D S D S t + ≤ +  
as ts1s2 > t when stores are situated on different locations.   
Hence, if one store is preferred over the other for all categories, buying all products in this store 
provides the lowest total variable costs. Given that both stores have equal unit fixed costs, this 
minimizes total shopping costs.  
Result 1b: If stores have uniform category-specific store preferences, (cases 1 and 2 in Figure 2), 
consumers will always prefer a single store shopping pattern. 
Even when fixed unit costs differ across stores, consumers will rule out MSS patterns as long as 
category-specific store preferences are uniform across categories. As indicated below in result 2a, 
combined trips are never an option with uniform category preferences. Moreover, Appendix 2 shows 
that, with uniform category preferences, the total shopping cost of the separate strategy becomes a 
13   weighted average of those for the single store strategies, and can - therefore - never be lower than 
each of them.  
Result 2 (Single or Separate store shopping) 
Result 2a: Single or separate store shopping patterns will always be preferred over combined 
shopping patterns when there is no complementarity in category preferences between the stores 
(cases 1 to 4 in Figure 2).  
Proof: From result 1, we already know that consumers will always prefer a single store shopping 
pattern when (i) category-specific store preferences are uniform across categories (case 1 and 2) or (ii) 
when category-specific store preferences are asymmetric but fixed store shopping costs are the same 
(case 3). Result 2a adds that even when fixed costs differ and category preferences are asymmetric 
(case 4), the combined visit pattern will entail higher total costs than single as well as separate store 
shopping patterns. This is a direct result of the fact that - when both stores are visited on the same 
shopping trip - category purchases will exclusively be made in the most preferred store. Optimal 
category allocations are found by computing the first order derivative of the total cost function 
(equation (1c)) with respect to αp,s1, leading to:   p s p p s p D VC D VC 2 , 1 , − . As this expression does not 
depend on αp,s1 , boundary solutions are optimal. Hence, products for which variable costs are lower in 
store s1 will be exclusively bought in this store (αp,s1 =1), and vice versa. It follows that, unless there 
is category preference complementarity, both categories would be assigned to the same store, and 
there would be no point in patronizing two stores on combined visits. 
Result 2b: If category-specific store preferences are asymmetric and stores differ in unit fixed costs 
(case 4 in Figure 4), then consumers may find it optimal to engage in a MSS strategy with separate 
store visits. A necessary condition is a ‘total cost conflict’: the high fixed cost store must have lower 
variable costs per unit.  
The proof is given in Appendix 2. The intuition is as follows. Let store s1 be preferred over s2 for 
both categories. If fixed shopping costs are higher for store s1 than for store s2 (ts1 > ts2), consumers 
may be facing a ‘total cost conflict’ (see also Table 2 for a formal definition): exclusively visiting 
14   store s1 would imply lower total variable costs, but higher total fixed costs plus holding costs than a 
single store strategy involving store s2.  
In such a setting, the separate store strategy constitutes an ‘intermediate’ option between each of 
these single store strategies, and derives its interest from category preference asymmetries. Its total 
variable shopping costs hold the middle between those for the single store s1 and the single store s2 
strategies. Its total fixed plus holding costs will certainly exceed those of store s2 when visited alone. 
Yet, these costs may be lower than those when only s1 is visited, if the category with the high storage 
cost is less strongly preferred in store s1- the store with the higher fixed cost per trip. In this case, 
visiting both stores – instead of s1 or s2 alone – may entail two advantages. First, compared to visiting 
store s2 only, it allows to reduce total variable costs by transferring part of the basket to store s1. 
Second, by still visiting the low unit fixed cost store s2 for in-between purchases of the high holding 
cost category (the category with the weakest store preference for s1), it allows to keep fixed and 
holding costs lower than when only s1 is patronized.
8. Henceforth, we refer to the conditions in result 
2b as conditions for ‘fixed cost complementarity’. 
Result 3: (Single, Separate or Combined store shopping)  
Result 3a: If stores exhibit category preference complementarity, each of the three shopping 
strategies may become optimal, whether fixed costs are the same or different (cases 5 and 6;Figure 2) 
The proof is given in Appendix 2. Let stores be such that s1 is preferred for category p1 and s2 for 
p2. We first consider the case where fixed shopping costs per trip are the same for both stores (ts1 = 
ts2=t). The best single store strategy will be that with the lower total variable cost. This best single 
store strategy then has to be evaluated against the multiple store alternatives. It is clear that when both 
stores have the same fixed costs per trip, the single store strategy implies lower total holding plus 
fixed costs than any multiple store alternative. However, as the stores are preference complements, 
patronizing them both allows to purchase each category in the preferred store, thereby reducing the 
                                                 
8 Note that Krider and Weinberg’s (2000) results can be considered to be a special case of this MSS situation. Indeed, although Krider and 
Weinberg do not account for category preference complementarity (in their analysis, one store – the discounter – has lower net variable 
costs for all categories), category preference asymmetries are built in into their model through the holding costs. The higher storage cost for 
perishable products implies that with VCp1,s1 -  VCp1,s2 = VCp2,s1 -  VCp2,s2 , Ip2,s1-s2 can still be smaller in absolute value than Ip1,s1-s2 when Sp2 > 
Sp1, p2 being the perishable product and s2 the more expensive regular store. As demonstrated by Krider and Weinberg and in line with 
result 2, this may lead consumers to buy part of their purchases in the preferred store s1 (in their case, the discounter), while making fill-in 
trips for the higher storage cost good (the perishable product) in the 2
nd preference store (the regular store). 
15   total variable cost component. Deciding upon single versus multiple store strategies therefore requires 
a trade off between the increase in total fixed plus holding costs and the decrease in total variable 
costs, from the multiple store strategy.  
When fixed shopping costs differ between stores (ts1  ≠ t s2), the motives for selecting single, 
separate or combined visits become a mixture of the previous motivations. The introduction of 
differences in unit fixed costs will reinforce the appeal of strategy II if the high storage cost category 
is more strongly preferred in the store with the lower unit fixed cost. Conversely, if the high holding 
cost category is more strongly preferred in the high fixed cost store, the single and combined 
strategies become relatively more appealing. 
How will consumers allocate their purchases across stores in these category-based MSS patterns? 
When both stores are visited on combined shopping trips, we showed under 2a that each product is 
purchased exclusively in the most preferred store. For the separate store strategy, allocation of 
category purchases will depend on the strength of category specific store preferences. When the 
difference in unit variable costs is sufficiently large, and the number of shopping trips to the preferred 
store sufficiently high, category p1 will be exclusively bought in store s1 even if store s2 is also 
visited by the consumer. We refer to this condition as ‘strong category preference complementarity’, a 
formal characterization is given in Table 2. Otherwise, consumers will purchase some portion of their 
category demand in the non-preferred store when that store is visited. This allows them to reduce total 
fixed plus holding costs – be it at the expense of higher total variable costs. The proof can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
Result 3b: The combined strategy will certainly be preferred over the separate strategy if the stores  
•  have strong category preference complementarity 
•  have the same unit fixed costs  
and 
16   •  are located sufficiently close such that 
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Proof: Let stores be such that s1 is preferred for category p1 and s2 for p2 and that unit fixed 
costs are equal (ts1 = ts2=t). With strong preference complementarity, we know that  1 1 , 1 = s p α and 
0 1 , 2 = s p α  for each multiple store strategy. Substituting this in the cost expressions from Table 1, we 
find that the separate store (II) and combined store (III) strategies yield identical total variable costs. 
The choice between these strategies is now completely driven by fixed and holding cost efficiencies. 
Specifically, a sufficient condition for the combined store strategy to be preferred over the separate 
store strategy is that  
) D S D S ( t 2 D tS 2 D tS 2 2 p 2 p 1 p 1 p 2 s 1 s 2 p 2 p 1 p 1 p + > + , which is equivalent to (2). We 
conclude that with strong preference complementarity, equal unit fixed costs and (2) satisfied, strategy 
III dominates strategy II.  
Note that (2) is more likely to hold if the distance between the stores is small relative to their 
fixed in-store costs – implying that ts1s2 is small relative to t. The condition further reveals that with 
strong store preference complementarity, the separate store visit pattern (II) can never prevail if 
categories have the same ‘holding cost potential’. Indeed, if  2 2 1 1 p p p p D S D S = , condition (2) 
becomes: 2t>ts1s2, a requirement that always holds. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
To empirically validate our theoretical developments and assess the parameters of the shopping 
cost functions, we estimate a multinomial logit model. The systematic utility components represent 
the total shopping cost per period for the shopping pattern (included in negative form, like in Bell et 
al. 1998):  (for a single store pattern I involving store s
h
s I i TC , − i),  ) (for a separate-trip 
h
s s II j i TC ) , ( , −
17   pattern II involving the set of stores (si,sj)), and   (for selecting the set of stores (s
h
s s III j i TC ) , ( , − i,sj) in a 
combined-trip pattern III): 
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where  ,  and  are the probability for a single-store pattern with store s
h
s I i P ,
h
s s II j i P ) , ( ,
h
s s III j i P ) , ( , i, a 
separate-trip pattern with stores (si,sj), and a combined-trip pattern with stores (si,sj) resp.  
 
4.1. Data and Operationalizations 
 
Household and Store selection 
To estimate the model, we use a scanner panel data set provided by GfK, comprising store visit 
and category purchase data for a random subsample of GfK’s national household panel, over a period  
of 34 weeks. We include the top 12 national chains, which account for about 90 % of the market sales 
value and 87 % of total store visits, and retain only households for whom at least 80% of their grocery 
purchases occur in these stores. In addition, we restrict the consideration set to the seven stores most 
closely located to the household’s home. Previous studies have demonstrated that consumers seldom 
include more than 7 stores in their consideration set (Fox et al., 2004: 6 store chains; Bell et al. 1998: 
5 supermarkets; González-Benito et al., 2007: 7 stores), and that distance is the primary criterion for 
choice set delineation (Sinha, 2000; Fox et al., 2004, González-Benito et al., 2007). In all, our data set 
contains information for 906 households and 12 grocery chains (representing four different store 
formats).  
18   Dependent variable: shopping patterns/ store set identification 
The dependent variable in our model represents the household’s stable selection of a shopping 
pattern (I single, II separate, or III combined) and - within each pattern - choice of a specific store 
(pattern I) or set of stores (pattern II and III). To operationalize this variable, we proceed as follows. 
First, as even the ‘hard core loyal’ consumers do occasionally patronize stores other than their 
primary chain, we characterize consumers as single store shoppers if they spend more than 80% of 
their shopping baskets at one and the same store. Consumers that do not meet that cut-off are 
classified as multiple store shoppers. Second, of these multiple store shoppers, consumers for whom 
the majority of store visits occur on combined trips (visits to more than one store on the same part of 
the day; see Fox & Hoch, 2005) are identified as combined-store shoppers. The remaining households 
are typified as separate-store shoppers. Consistent with previous findings, we find that many 
consumers visit multiple stores on a regular basis (62 % of the consumers are classified as systematic 
multiple store shoppers, 78% of them do so predominantly on separate store visits). The data also 
demonstrate that the choice of shopping pattern is quite stable: over 80 % of the consumers selected 
the same shopping pattern in the first and second half of the data period, the remaining 20% changing 
from one multiple store shopping pattern to another.  
Explanatory variables: Cost components 
Variable Costs. To incorporate net variable shopping costs, we first classify the products in our 
data set into broader product category types (p), based on their (i) levels of demand (Sprott, Manning 
& Miyazaki, 2003; Dhar, Hoch & Kumar, 2001), (ii) importance of quality and perceived quality 
differences, and (iii) degrees of perishability/storability (Krider & Weinberg 2000). Like Fader and 
Lodish (1990), and Dhar et al. (2001), we use these dimensions to distinguish specialties (low 
demand, and perishability, high perceived quality differences), from fresh categories (high demand, 
perceived quality differences and perishability), and convenience categories (low perceived quality 
differences and perishability) - the latter comprising both staples (high demand), and necessities (low 
demand)
9. The products in our data set are classified into these ‘generic’ product category types by 
                                                 
9 An advantage of this classification (which is also in line with the typology of the FMI, 1995) is that it is based on intrinsic category and 
consumer characteristics, and not on more endogeneous measures that refer to the outcome of the shopping pattern choice process – such as 
19   two independent experts, yielding high inter-expert reliability. Examples of products in each category 
type are: canned food (convenience categories), health and beauty care (specialties) and fish/meat 
(fresh categories).  For each of these product category types, a household’s demand ( ) is 
computed on a monthly basis and, to allow for meaningful aggregation across products, expressed in 
monetary units (at the product’s average market price). Next, to obtain an estimate of store-specific 
variable costs and benefits, this demand variable is multiplied with the store’s price index ( ) 
and variable benefit index for the product (
h
p D
i s p PI ,
, i p s VBI ), resp. Given our purpose to explain stable 
shopping patterns, we include ‘average’ store characteristics over the observation period as 
explanatory variables in the model. The variable benefit index reflects both intrinsic quality and 
assortment, and is obtained as  , where  is an indicator of the average 
quality of product p in store s
k
s s p s p i i i Size QI VBI ) ( * , , =
i s p QI ,
i (obtained from surveys among store shoppers; Testaankoop, 2000), 
is a measure of store surface (see González-Benito et al., 2007, for a similar approach), and κ is 
a parameter (capturing the effect of assortment size on perceived variable benefits).  
i s Size
Holding costs. Like Krider and Weinberg (2000), we assume holding costs to be similar for 
convenience and specialty products, and lower than those of fresh goods. For lack of reliable storage 
cost measures, we treat both the base level (σ, representing the cost of one-month storage expressed 
as a percentage of the products’ purchase value) and the differences between products (the storage 
cost index  , set to one for convenience and specialty products, and estimated for fresh products) 
as ‘parameters’ in the model. 
p SI
Fixed costs. Previous research has demonstrated that in-store benefits and costs are strongly 
related to type of store format. In-store search and waiting costs are typically higher for larger stores 
(such as hypermarkets), while in-store benefits tend to be lower for discount stores (which usually 
economize on store layout and customer service in order to keep product prices down). Based on these 
two dimensions – store size and price/quality position - four stylized types of grocery store formats 
                                                                                                                                                        
purchase frequency or exclusive store patronage /destination shopping. This is important, as we wish to derive optimal shopping patterns 
and store selection processes as outcomes of a given grocery setting. Given this objective, starting from a shopping behavior-based 
classification would be problematic. 
20   can be distinguished (Kahn & McAlister, 1997; Sinha, 2000; Popkowski-Leszczyc, Sinha  & 
Timmermans, 2000; González-Benito, 2004): (i) small & quality-oriented supermarkets, (ii) large & 
quality-oriented superstores, (iii) small & price-oriented hard discounters, and (iv) large & price-
oriented large discounters. To capture the resulting differences in net fixed shopping costs between 
these store formats, we incorporate a parameter f δ into the model, reflecting the in-store costs minus 
benefits for each store format f (where f is hard discounter HD, large discounter LD, superstore SS or 
supermarket SM). For combined shopping trips, we specify the total in-store shopping cost as a 
fraction ν of the sum of in-store shopping costs for the two store visits. In the analysis below, we set ν 
equal to ¾, which is half way between the two extremes of adding or averaging the in-store costs 
across stores. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the estimated parameters are rather insensitive to the 
specific level of ν. In addition, to account for transportation costs associated with the trip to and from 
the store, we introduce the distance ( ) between a household’s residence and the store s
h
si Dist i . 
Plugging these cost components into the optimal cost expressions derived in Table 1, the total 
costs for the single pattern (I), separate pattern (II) and combined pattern (III) in equations (3a), (3b) 
and (3c) take the following form: 
 
 
where the variables and their operationalizations are summarized in Table 3, and the parameters 
to be estimated refer to storage cost (σ, and  ), the impact of distance on fixed shopping cost  fresh p SI =
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21   (β ), fixed in-store shopping cost minus benefits by format ( f δ for f=HD, LD, SS and SM ), the 
weight attached to variable benefits (as opposed to purchase price, γ ), and the coefficient measuring 
the impact of assortment size on variable store benefits (κ ).  
 
4.2. Model estimation. 
 
 Parameter estimates are obtained by maximizing the following likelihood function: 
 
 where  ,  and  indicate whether the household exhibited a single pattern (I) to 
store s
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k, a separate-store pattern (II) to sk and sl, or a combined-store pattern (III) to sk and sl, resp. 
As can be seen from expressions (4a)-(4b)-(4c), the base level of holding costs σ on the one hand, and 
the parameters driving fixed shopping cost β and  f δ for f= HD, LD, SS and SM; on the other hand, 
are identified up to a scale factor only. We therefore set σ equal to one and estimate the levels of 
β and  f δ relative to this value of σ
10. 
For multiple store shopping patterns, the fraction of a product’s demand fulfilled in a store si 
( and  ) are themselves a complex function of the remaining model parameters (see Table 
1). Model estimation is, therefore, carried out in two steps. In a first step, we set the level of 
and  equal to .5, and obtain preliminary estimates for the model parameters. Based on 
these initial parameter values, we then calculate ‘updated’ values for  and  (note that for 
separate shopping trips where we do not have closed form expressions for optimal trip frequencies 
and category allocations, this updating requires an iterative procedure). In a second step
i s p II , , α
i s p III , , α
i s p II , , α
i s p III , , α
i s p II , , α
i s p III , , α
11, these new 
and  are fed into equations (4b) and (4c), to obtain our final estimates.  
i s p II , , α
i s p III , , α
                                                 
10 In a later stage, additional data on the households’ number of shopping trips are used to separate out the holding costs from the fixed 
shopping costs. 
11 Additional iterations did not entail further parameter changes. 
22   Apart from estimating mean parameter levels, we are interested in assessing the stability of these 
parameters across households. However, given that we have only one observation (stable shopping 
pattern) per household, mixed-logit estimation does not provide us with reliable estimates for across-
household variances (see Small, Winston & Yan, 2003 for a similar observation). We therefore adopt 
a bootstrapping procedure, re-estimating the model coefficients for 500 random samples of 
households from the original data set.  
 
4.3. Estimation Results 
 
Parameter estimates and Fit.  
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results, for the full sample as well as for the bootstrapping 
procedure. As expected, distance significantly increases the fixed shopping cost (β=.329, p<.01). 
Conversely, the store’s variable benefits, themselves influenced by assortment size (κ =.104, p<.01); 
significantly reduce this shopping cost (γ=-1.325, p<.01). The cost of holding fresh products reveals 
to be about 2.5 times that of other product types ( =2.519, p<.01), a figure that makes intuitive 
sense. Fixed in-store costs (net of benefits) are highest for large discounters immediately followed by 
hard discounters, and are significantly lower for both superstores and supermarkets. This suggests that 
households’ perceptions of fixed in-store costs are not primarily driven by time costs induced by store 
size, but strongly attenuated by ambience attributes like store atmosphere, cleanliness and friendliness 
-attributes on which superstores and supermarkets score highly. The estimated bootstrap coefficients 
are, on average, very close to the full sample coefficients, while revealing heterogeneity especially in 
in-store fixed costs of the hard discounters.  
fresh SI
Table 5 reports net variable costs divided by storage cost, across category types for each chain. 
Note that this metric is crucial for assessing the presence of preference asymmetry or 
complementarity (see Table 2). As expected, these (weighted) net variable costs per unit are lowest in 
large discounters, which have come to carry large assortments of high quality products while 
maintaining low prices. Because of their high prices, supermarkets typically exhibit higher net 
23   variable costs per unit than the two hard discounters for convenience products, but not for specialties 
and fresh products where their assortment or quality advantage may prevail. At the same time, stores 
within the supermarket format, as well as the two superstores, still show substantial variation in the 
appeal of their offer. 
Benchmark models 
To further assess the model’s descriptive validity, we compare it with two benchmarks. Our first 
null model, M0, is a model with store constants only, estimated as the stores’ share of visits in the 
market. A second benchmark model, M1, specifies the utility for a store set as the average utility of 
each of the two stores, this average utility being (minus) the total shopping cost of a single store 
shopping pattern. This second benchmark takes distance and store characteristics into account, but 
does not recognize store complementarity (e.g. the possibility to avoid fixed shopping costs by 
combining closely located stores, or to reduce variable shopping costs by selectively purchasing 
different categories in different stores).  Comparison reveals that the full model (given by (3a)-(3c) 
and (4a)-(4c)) yields a significantly better fit: its loglikelihood (ll= -2971.7) and BIC (5991.1) being 
significantly higher (lower) than that of both benchmarks (M0: ll= -3435.0, BIC=6951.8; M1: ll= 
-3013.5, BIC=6074.6).  
In the models above, each consumer is uniquely associated with his ‘dominant’ shopping pattern 
and store (set) over the 34 week period. Even though these shopping patterns appear to be stable over 
time, we conduct a robustness check. We divide the total observation period in a sequence of 4-week 
observations, and assess the consumers’ shopping pattern in each of those periods. We then re-
estimate the model using as the dependent variable the fraction of times a consumer exhibits a single, 
separate or combined store shopping pattern (instead of the original zero/one formulation). The 
resulting coefficients reveal highly similar to those reported in Table 4, supporting the robustness of 




24   In this section, we illustrate the spatial competition between store chains implied by our estimated 
shopping cost model. To this end, we consider market areas in which consumers are uniformly 
distributed, and have access to two store chain outlets. Using the cost estimates for these chains we 
then determine, for given consumer demand characteristics (D
h=8, with expenditure shares of 
convenience, specialty and fresh products equal to .7, .1 and .2), consumers’ optimal shopping 
patterns as a function of their distance to the stores. The results demonstrate that – depending on the 
type and strength of store complementarity and the distance between stores - three typical spatial 
competition patterns emerge: (i) winner-takes-all competition, (ii) partial eclipse competition and (iii) 
jig-saw competition. Figures 3-5 provide a graphical illustration of these competition patterns, which 
are discussed in more detail below. Note that spatial competition patterns can become somewhat more 
complex in real life situations, when for instance, more than two stores are located in the same trading 
area, stores are located closer (or farther away) from each other, or consumers differ on other aspects 
than distance to the store (e.g. socio-demographic and/or purchase behavior profile). Yet, the more 
simple cases displayed in Figure 3 to 5 clearly indicate that, depending on the type and strength of 
store complementarity, the competitive situation may range from a ‘share-of-customer’ to a ‘share-of-
wallet’ rivalry. 
Winner-takes-all competition. Figure 3 pictures the competition between Aldi (hard discounter) 
and Makro (large discounter), with stores located at a distance of 3.5 km, a realistic figure based on 
our data set. As can be seen from Table 5, there is no complementarity in category preferences 
between these stores (for each category, net variable costs of Makro are lower than those of Aldi), 
ruling out combined shopping patterns. In addition, while the Aldi-Makro combination may lead to a 
total cost conflict (variable costs being lower but in-store costs higher at Makro), differences in 
category-specific store preferences across categories are negligible (weak category preference 
asymmetry
12), canceling out the possible advantages of separate store visits. It follows that there is 
little incentive for multiple store shopping, which results in ‘Winner takes all’ competition. 
Consumers patronize only one of both stores, and the spatial pattern is such that each format is the 
                                                 
12 Since – in reality - variable cost differences will never be exactly the same for all product categories, this case represents a reasonable 
approximation of the ‘different fixed costs-uniform category preferences’ situation discussed above.    
25   preferred alternative in its surrounding area, fighting for the complete wallet of consumers in the 
border zone
13. Note that the size of these areas depends on store location: as the hard discounter (with 
higher variable costs) moves closer to the large discounter, its customer core will become smaller, 
more consumers shopping exclusively at Makro.   
Partial-eclipse competition: Figure 4 illustrates, using the same between store distance of 3.5 km, 
the spatial distribution of optimal shopping patterns for Champion (supermarket) and Intermarché 
(large discounter). While there is no complementarity between these stores in category-specific store 
preference (Intermarché offering lower variable costs for all categories), the variable cost advantage 
of Intermarché is clearly much larger for convenience items than for other product categories 
(category preference asymmetry, see Table 5). Compared to the hard-large discounter combination 
discussed above, there is also a much larger difference in in-store fixed costs (lower for the 
supermarket Champion), leading to a more pronounced ‘total cost conflict’. This results in an 
interesting competitive pattern that we refer to as Partial Eclipse Competition. Within a concentric 
area around the supermarket, consumers allocate their entire grocery basket to that outlet. Conversely, 
customers located out of that area will prefer single format patterns to the large discounter. Exceptions 
are consumers in the ‘shield’ or ‘partial eclipse’ zone between the formats. Motivated by ‘fixed cost 
complementarity’, those consumers engage in MSS with separate visits to each store. This allows 
them to economize on total fixed plus holding costs by purchasing high demand or perishable 
categories from the small format during fill-in visits. At the same time, they allocate a large part of 
their basket to the format with the most favorable price/quality positioning, keeping total variable 
costs low. Hence, each format may compete for (i) an extension of its ‘exclusive’ trading area and/or 
(ii) a larger share of wallet from consumers in the MSS zone.  
Jig-saw competition :  Figure 5 represents the optimal shopping patterns for DelhaizeDeLeeuw 
(supermarket) and GBSuper (supermarket). As these stores are usually located quite closely together 
(same store format, competing for the same type of customers, see González-Benito, 2007), we set the 
between store distance at a low .3 km. While in-store fixed costs of these stores are much the same, 
                                                 
13 Note that this result is not in contrast with result 2b, which states that preference asymmetry and a total cost conflict are necessary 
conditions for separate store shopping to occur. These conditions are, however, not sufficient. As indicated in the discussion below result 2b, 
single store shopping patterns may still be optimal when cost advantages of the ‘compromise’ separate store strategy (lower variable costs 
than s2, lower fixed shopping costs than s1) are insufficient to bring total costs below the level of any of the single store strategies.     
26   they differ in variable shopping costs. More specifically, DelhaizeDeLeeuw has higher variable costs 
for convenience items but a more appealing offer for specialty products compared to the rival 
supermarket GBSuper. These category preference reversals induce more complex competitive 
patterns, or Jig-Saw Competition, motivating some consumers to engage in either separate or 
combined multiple store shopping. While the stores’ immediately surrounding area typically 
comprises single store shoppers, consumers in the area situated in-between the two store sites may 
engage in separate store shopping. For customers living farther away from the chain outlets, variable 
cost advantages of separate store visits may no longer compensate for the much higher transportation 
costs. Yet, when both stores are visited on the same shopping trip, additional transportation costs 
become relatively small. Customers in the border zone may therefore decide to visit both stores on 
combined shopping trips, implying that category purchases will be exclusively allocated to one of 
both stores. Sensitivity analysis reveals that these ‘combined shopping trip’ zones are conditional on 
the stores being positioned closely together, and gradually shrink with larger between-store distances.  
 
6.  Discussion, limitations and future research  
 
In line with previous indications in the literature, we find that (i) the majority of consumers 
regularly visits more than one store for grocery purchases, (ii) sales promotions alone do not explain 
why consumers engage in multiple-store shopping, and (iii) many store ‘switches’ appear to be a 
rather regular sequence of multiple store visits. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide a 
comprehensive and formal analysis of why and how customers divide their grocery purchases over 
different stores on a systematic basis. By considering (i) shopping benefits as well as costs, (ii) store 
choice as well as visit frequency and category purchase allocations, and (iii) overall as well as 
category-specific store features, we provide a more complete and more accurate account of systematic 
multiple store shopping motivations and shopping patterns. 
Motives for systematic (non-promotion based) multiple store shopping. Our research reveals that - 
even in the absence of promotions - consumers may have good reasons for shopping multiple grocery 
27   stores. In particular, we find that grocery outlets may only become part of a multiple store strategy if 
they exhibit fixed cost complementarity or category preference complementarity.  
First, patronizing stores with different fixed shopping costs may be an appealing compromise 
strategy between exclusively shopping in either of these stores alone. This is true even if one store 
offers better value for all categories, provided that (i) there is preference asymmetry –the degree of 
store preference differs across categories and (ii) there is a ‘total cost conflict’- the high unit variable 
cost store having the lower unit fixed cost. We refer to this case as ‘fixed cost complementarity’. By 
purchasing the more strongly preferred categories primarily in the high fixed cost store, but 
organizing in-between visits for the other categories in the low fixed cost store, the consumer may 
achieve the ‘best of both worlds’.  
Second, we show that multiple store shopping may also be triggered by category preference 
complementarity - each store being preferred for at least one of the product categories. By 
systematically buying products in the store where they are most attractive, consumers can minimize 
their total variable shopping costs.  
MSS trip organization. Our research establishes a link between these motives and the way 
shopping trips are organized. With fixed cost-complementarity, stores are always visited on separate 
shopping trips. With category preference complementarity, consumers may also engage in combined 
shopping trips, and the choice between separate versus combined store visits presents an interesting 
trade off between fixed and variable shopping costs. On the one hand, combined visits allow the 
consumer to save on transportation costs per trip and purchase each product exclusively in the store 
where it is preferred. When the stores are visited on separate trips, however, the number of trips per 
store can differ, and trips to different stores can be spread in time. This allows the consumer to 
purchase high holding cost categories on a more frequent basis, shifting some portion of the 
categories’ purchases to the less preferred store.  
Patterns of Spatial Competition between grocery stores. Empirical results obtained from a 
scanner panel data set support the descriptive validity of our shopping cost model (and its implied 
complementarities), and allow to picture its implications for the spatial competition between store 
chains. Specifically, we identify three prototypical types of store competition: ‘Winner Takes All’ 
28   competition - each consumer being loyal to one store, ‘Partial Eclipse Competition’, where at least a 
fraction of consumers - situated between the stores - will patronize both stores on separate visits, and 
‘Jig-Saw Competition’ with designated zones of consumers engaging in single store shopping, 
separate store shopping and combined store shopping strategies. These competitive patterns offer 
important insights for retailers: depending on the store’s characteristics compared with local 
competitors, the retailer may find it more appropriate to pursue complete loyalty among a subset of 
consumers, or to make the most out of ‘cohabiting’ with these competitors by even encouraging MSS 
shopping. Store complementarities – and hence the prevailing competitive pattern – appear to be 
linked to store format. In particular, our empirical results suggest that fixed cost complementarity is 
more likely to occur between large discounters (with high in-store fixed costs and low unit variable 
costs especially for convenience categories) on the one hand and supermarkets or superstores (which, 
due to their pleasant ambience, entail low in-store fixed costs, coupled with an appealing offer for 
fresh and specialty items) on the other. For these store pairs, separate visit-multiple store shopping, 
where major trips alternate with fill-in trips to replenish high storage cost categories) is bound to 
occur. At the same time, we find evidence of category preference complementarity between hard 
discounters and supermarkets, and among supermarkets. This may encourage consumers to selectively 
buy different categories in these different stores, either on separate or combined trips. Absolute and 
inter-store distances appear to play a crucial role in the choice between the two multiple store 
shopping strategies, separate visits being more likely in the stores’ intersecting zone and combined 
shopping trips in the more distantly located border zone (where – depending on the inter-store 
distance – the additional fixed costs of combined visits may become relatively small).  
 
Limitations and Future Research. Clearly, this research exhibits limitations, and leaves ample 
opportunities for future research. First, our formal model is stylised, focusing on multiple store 
shopping patterns involving two stores. Analysing patterns including three or more stores may be an 
interesting research avenue.  Second, the stores considered are food-oriented retail outlets, essentially 
carrying the same assortment. Considering a broader set of retail formats may add to the complexity 
of the shopping decision process – which may become single as well as multiple purpose – yielding 
29   30   
additional insights into multiple store shopping motivations.  Third, our shopping model describes 
consumers as fully informed, rational decision makers, with fixed category demand and able to 
perfectly plan their consumption ahead. Interesting extensions of our model would be to include the 
possibility of category consumption expansion, impulse purchases, and urgent/unplanned trips. These 
will add to the realism of our model, and may uncover additional motives for multiple store shopping. 
Fourth, given our focus on systematic multiple store shopping, we consider a ‘stable’ setting , leaving 
out the impact of temporary promotions. This allows us to isolate non-promotional motives triggering 
multiple store shopping. Adding the effect of promotional strategies to our equilibrium model will 
lead to an even richer representation of consumer shopping behavior, indicating how opportunistic - 
promotion-based - store switching interacts with MSS. Fifth, like most previous store choice papers, 
we use simple cost specifications. Introducing thresholds/nonlinearities like storage space constraints, 
the purchase of discrete package sizes, and time-dependent transaction costs would be a fruitful 
extension of our model. Finally, while the main focus in this paper is on optimal shopping patterns 
from the consumer’s viewpoint, an important next step will be the development of normative retailer 
models accommodating consumers’ MSS shopping behavior. 30   
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Figure 5: ‘Jig-Saw’ Competition 
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Table 1: Minimum Total Cost and Optimal decisions 
Pattern  Number of Trips  Category Allocation   Total Cost* 
Single 
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Table 2: Glossary of key terms linked to MSS Motivations  
Term Description  Specification 
Category-specific store 
preference for product p1 in 
store s1 compared to store s2 
The difference between   
product p1’s unit variable cost, 
divided by its unit holding 
cost, in store s2 and store s1 
1
1 , 1 2 , 1
2 1 , 1
) (
p
s p s p




= −  
If greater than 0, store s1 is preferred 
over store s2 for product p1 
Uniform  category  preferences   Based on variable costs 
divided by holding costs, one 
store may be preferred over 
the other for both categories, 
but the difference in store 
preference is the same for all 
categories 
2 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 s s p s s p I I − − =  
Category preference 
asymmetry 
Based on variable costs 
divided by holding costs, one 
store is preferred over the 
other for both categories, but 
the difference in store 
preference is greater for one 
category than for the other 
 
2 1 , 2 2 1 , 1
2 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 0 .
s s p s s p











Based on variable costs 
divided by holding costs, one 
store is preferred over the 
other for one category, but the 
other store is preferred for the 
second category 
 
0 . 2 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 < − − s s p s s p I I  
Strong category preference 
complementarity 
Based on variable costs 
divided by holding costs, each 
store is preferred for one of the 
categories. In addition, 
cat.spec.store preferences are 
sufficiently strong, so that 
each category will exclusively 
be purchased in the most 
preferred store (α=1 or 0). 
0 . 2 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 < − − s s p s s p I I  
and 
*
1 2 1 , 1 / 1 s s s p N I > −  
Ns1* represents the lowest optimal 
number of trips per period to store s1 
under all possible shopping patterns 
including store s1 
 
Total  cost  conflict  One store offers the lowest 
fixed costs, the other store the 
lowest variable costs.  
ts1 > ts2  




  34Table 3: Overview of explanatory variables 
Variable Operationalization 
p   Product indicator. Product categories are classified as either convenience, 
(p=1), specialties (p=2) or fresh products (p=3). 
h
p D   Demand for product p by household h over a one month period, expressed in 
monetary units (100 Euros) based on the average category prices across 
stores.  
p S   Storage cost per unit for category p over a one month period.  p p SI S * σ =  
where σ represents the base level and  a category-specific multiplier (set 




s t 1  Net fixed cost incurred per trip to the store si for household h. 
where  represents the store format indicator, equal 




s Dist I t 1 1 , 1 β + =
i s f I ,
i belongs to format f (Hard discounter, Large 
discounter, Superstore, Supermarkets) and zero elsewhere and  is the 




expressed in kilometres.  
i s p VC ,   Net variable cost per unit of category p in store s1. 
i i i s p s p s p VBI PI VC , , , − = where   represents the price index for product 
p in store s
i s p PI ,
i, defined as the store ‘s own unit price for the product, relative to 
the average product unit price across stores and  is the Index for 
‘variable benefits’ per unit (100 Euro) spent on product p in store s
, i ps VBI
i. 
,, *( )
ii ps ps s VBI QI Size
κ = , where  is a quality indicator for product 
p, store s
i s p QI ,
i,  reflects store surface and κ is a parameter.  r Size
 
Table 4. Estimation Results 
 
 
Base Sample  Bootstrap: (500 samples)  Parameter 
Mean SD  Mean SD  across  samples 
β (Distance)  .329 .068 .334 .040 
Variable Benefit : 
γ (Quality)  -1.325 .475  -1.256 .054 
κ (Assortment  Size)  .104 .042 .109 .016 
fresh SI (Holding Cost 
Index Fresh) 
2.519 .872  2.559 .048 
In-store Fixed Cost : 
HD δ (Hard Discounter)  .994 .234 1.210  .226 
LD δ (Large Discounter)  1.438 .357  1.487 .094 
SS δ (Superstore)  -.016 .054  -.034 .088 
 
  35Table 5: Net Variable costs by category type for different chains 
Unit Variable Cost Index divided by Unit Holding Cost Index 
(PIp,s - VBIp,s)/SIp
Chain Format 
Convenience Specialties  Fresh 
Aldi Hard  discounter  -.231  -.163  -.0312 
Champion Supermarket  -.187  -.211  -.103 
Colruyt Large  discounter  -.480  -.546  -.206 
Cora Superstore  -.342  -.382  -.146 
DelhaizeAD Supermarket -.157  -.194  -.073 
DelhaizeDL Supermarket -.132  -.163  -.068 
GBMaxi Superstore  -.212  -.122  -.081 
GBSuper Supermarket  -.147  -.111  -.050 
GBSuperpartner Supermarket  -.164  -.155  -.065 
Intermarché Large  discounter  -.390  -.392  -.156 
Lidl Hard  discounter  -.230  -.178  -.065 
Makro Large  discounter  -.390  -.449  -.173 
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  38Appendix 1: Derivation of optimal category purchase allocations, number of trips, and 
optimal total cost 
 
A.1.1. Optimal Category Purchase Allocations 
For each multiple store shopping pattern, optimal category purchase allocations (expressions for αp,s) are 
derived conditional upon store visit frequencies (Ns). 
 
Shopping Pattern II: separate visits to store s1 (Ns1 visits) and store s2 (Ns2 visits). 
Computing the first order derivative of total costs in equation (1b) wrt αp,s1 and setting it equal to zero leads to 
the following expression: 
0 2 ) 1 ( 2 2 2 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 , 1 ,
1 ,
= − − + − = ∂ ∂ s p p s p s p p s p p s p p s p
s p
N D S N D S D VC D VC TC α α α
     
 (A1) 
implying that: 
[ ] ) 1 1 ( 1 / ) ( 2 1 2 2 , 1 ,
*
1 , s s s p s p s p s p N N N S VC VC + + + − = α  
or, letting 
p
s p s p
s s p S
VC VC
I
) ( 1 , 2 ,
2 1 ,
−
= − , 
[ ] ) 1 1 ( 1 2 1 2 2 1 ,
*
1 , s s s s s p s p N N N I + + = − α              ( A 2 )  
From the above expression (A1) , it is clear that the second derivative wrt αp,s1 is positive – such that the second 
order optimality condition is satisfied. Furthermore, given the requirement that  , a necessary 
condition for this allocation to be meaningful is  
1 0
*
1 , ≤ ≤ s p α
[ ] 1 s 2 s 1 s , p p 2 s , p 1 s , p N 1 I S / ) VC VC ( < = + − −                           (A3a) 
and  
[ ] 2 s p 2 s , p 1 s , p N 1 S / ) VC VC ( − > + −                             (A3b) 
If (A3a) is violated, it follows that α*p,s1=1: it is optimal to purchase all of category p in store s1. Conversely, 
violation of (A3b) implies that α*p,s1 must be set at the lower boundary (α*p,s1 =0), such that all of Dp is bought 
in store s2. 
 
A.1.2. Optimal Trip Planning 
Knowing the optimal category purchase allocations, we can now derive – for each shopping pattern - the cost-
minimizing number of shopping trips to the selected stores.  
 
Pattern I (single store shopping) 
The simplest case is that where only one store –say, store s1- is selected and visited repeatedly (pattern I).  
Setting the first order derivative of total costs (equation (1a)) wrt Ns1 equal to 0, and noting that the second order 
derivative is positive, immediately implies the following cost-minimizing number of trips to store s1: 
1 2 2 1 1 1
* 2 ) ( s p p p p s t D S D S N + =  
Substituting this expression in the total cost function and rearranging terms yields the minimum total cost for 
pattern I: 
s1 p2, p2 s1 p1, p1 p2 p2 p1 p1 s1
*
s1 I, VC D VC D ) D S D (S 2t TC + + + =  
where the first term is the sum of the optimal total holding and fixed cost, and the second term indicates the total 
variable cost.  
 
Pattern II (multiple store shopping with separate visits) 
Next, consider the case of separate visits to stores s1 and s2 (pattern II), where optimal values for Ns1 and Ns2 
have to be determined.  
Let us first consider the case where the optimal category purchase allocations are given by: 
[ ] ) 1 1 ( 1 2 1 2 2 1 , 1
*
1 , 1 s s s s s p s p N N N I + + = − α and  [ ] ) 1 1 ( 1 2 1 2 2 1 , 2
*
1 , 2 s s s s s p s p N N N I + + = − α . 





1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 ,
2 , 1 , 1 1 ,
2 , 1 1
) 2 / ] / ) 1 ( / .[ /
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s s p p s p s p p s p s p p s p s s p
p s p s p s s p
p p p s
t N D S N D S N D S N
D VC VC N N
TC
+ − − − ∂ ∂ +
− ∂ ∂ = ∂
∂ ∑
=
α α α α
α
     (A4) 
  39It is easy to show that under the conditions just specified: 
)) / 1 / 1 /( ) / 1 ).(( / ( / 1 2 2 1 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 s s s s s p s s p N N N N N + = ∂ ∂ α α  
Moreover, we can write: 
) / 1 ) / 1 / 1 ( ( ] [ 2 2 1 1 , 1 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 1 1 2 , 1 1 , 1 s s s s p p p s s p p p p s p s p N N N S D I S D D VC VC − + − = − = − − α  
Substituting both of these expressions in (A4) and setting the result to zero leads – after some tedious 
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implying that the optimal number of trips to store s1 is given by  
1
2
1 , 2 2 2
2
1 , 1 1 1 1
* 2 ) ( s s p p p s p p p s t D S D S N α α + =  
The computations for N*s2 are completely similar.  
Substitution of these optima in the total cost function then yields: 
p2 s1 p2, s2 p2, s1 p2, s1 p2, p1 s1 p1, s2 p1, s1 p1, s1 p1,
2
s1 p2, p2 p2
2
s1 p1, p1 p1 s2
2
s1 p2, p2 p2
2
s1 p1, p1 p1 s1
*
II
))D α (1 α (VC ))D α (1 α (VC
) ) α (1 D S ) α (1 D (S 2t ) α D S α D (S 2t TC
− + + − +
+ − + − + + =
VC VC
 
where the first two terms now indicate the total fixed plus holding costs incurred through the visits to stores s1 
and s2, resp. 
 
Note that the optimal category allocations in (A2) were derived for each category independently - assuming that 
store visit timing can be tailored to each separate category. With two product categories, this is true as long as 
αp1,s1=1 for at least one category and store. In that case, the optimal cost expressions reduce to: 
p2 s2 p2, s1 p2, s1 p2, s1 p2, p1 s1 p1,
2
s1 p2, p2 p2 s2
2
s1 p2, p2 p2 p1 p1 s1
*
II
)D )VC α (1 α (VC D VC
) ) α (1 D (S 2t ) α D S D (S 2t TC
− + +
+ − + + =
 
if category p1 is bought exclusively in store s1 while category p2 is spread across stores,  
or to:  
p2 s2 p2, p1 s1 p1, p2 p2 s2 p1 p1 s1
*
II D D VC D S 2t D S 2t TC VC + + + =  
if p1 is bought exclusively in s1, and p2 exclusively in s2. 
 
However, if the optimal expressions in (A2) are strictly between zero and one for both categories (purchases for 
each category are spread across stores), these optima may not be simultaneously implementable or reconcilable 
into one shopping strategy. The reason is that, unless αp1,s1 =αp2,s1, each ‘optimal’ category allocation would 
correspond to a different timing of (the same Ns1 and Ns2) shopping trips. Under those circumstances, the 
shopping costs derived above constitute a lower bound on the true (optimal) costs of a separate store visit 
strategy. Moreover, for the separate visit strategy to become implementable, adjustments need to be made in the 
categories’ purchase allocation and in the corresponding timing of store visits (an issue likely to become more 
important as the number of categories increases). The need for, and nature of these adjustments, is taken up in 
Appendix 3.   
 
 
Pattern III (multiple store shopping with combined visits) 
It is easy to see that the derivations for pattern III (combined visits only) are completely comparable to those for 
the single store pattern but where, now, the unit fixed cost is that of the combined trip (ts1s2 instead of ts1), and 
categories are purchased in their preferred store (e.g. category p1 in store s1, category p2 in store s2): 
2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
* 2 ) ( s s p p p p s s t D S D S N + =  
After substitution in the total cost expression, the corresponding minimal cost is easily found to be: 
2 , 2 2 1 , 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
* ) ( 2 s p p s p p p p p p s s III VC D VC D D S D S t TC + + + =  
 
Appendix 2. Optimal shopping pattern selection 
Proof of Result 1b. 
 
  40If store preference is the same for both categories ( 2 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 s s p s s p I I − − = ), strategy II will never be retained. 






2 1 , ) 1 ( s I s s I s s s II TC TC TC α α − + = − .  
The total cost of the separate store strategy II, being a weighted average of the total costs of single strategies 
involving stores s1 and s2, can never be lower than each of these costs. Hence, with the same level of category 
preferences for store s1 in both categories, the separate store strategy is not selected. Result 2a further 
demonstrates that combined shopping patterns cannot be optimal either, implying that single store shopping 
patterns will always be preferred over MSS patterns in the case of uniform category-specific store preferences. 
 
Proof of Result 2b. 
Let store s1 be preferred over s2 for both categories (  and ), but have fixed shopping 
costs t
0 2 1 , 1 > −s s p I 0 2 1 , 2 > −s s p I
s1 that are different from store s2 (ts2). Following result 2a, shopping pattern III will never be optimal 
when there is no category preference complementarity. Hence, the consumer’s choice is limited to visiting store 
s1 alone, store s2 alone, or both stores on separate visits. 
 
Let us, first, consider the case where ts1 < ts2.  
It is clear that the cost of visiting store s1 alone is lower than that of visiting only store s2: 
p2,s1 p2 p1,s1 p1 p2 p2 p1 p1 s1
*
I,s1 VC D VC D ) D S D (S 2t TC + + + =  
< s2 p2, p2 s2 p1, p1 p2 p2 p1 p1 s2
*
s2 I, VC D VC D ) D S D (S 2t TC + + + =  
and lower than that of visiting both stores on separate trips: 
s1 p2, p2 s1 p1, p1 p2 p2 p1 p1 s1
*
s1 I, VC D VC D ) D S D (S 2t TC + + + = < 
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since  
0 2 1 , 1 > −s s p I  implies that   and   implies that    s2 p1, s1 p1, VC VC < 0 2 1 , 2 > −s s p I s2 p2, s1 p2, VC VC <
So: in the absence of a ‘total cost conflict’ (  and  and t 0 2 1 , 1 > −s s p I 0 2 1 , 2 > −s s p I s1 < ts2), the separate store 
strategy is ruled out. The optimal strategy remains a single store strategy with store s1. 
 
Second, consider the situation where ts1 > ts2. In this case, there is a ‘total cost conflict’, the low variable cost 
store s1 having the higher unit fixed cost. The consumer must now weigh the two single store strategies (I) (only 
visit store s1 or store s2), and the separate multiple store visits strategy (II), against one another.  
 
⇒ Comparing the two single store strategies, we know from Table 1 that store s1 will be selected as long as: 
2 1 , 2 2 2 2 1 , 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 ) ( 2 ) ( s s p p p s s p p p p p p p s s I S D I S D S D S D t t − − + < + −         ( A 5 )  
This condition may or may not hold, depending on the specific levels of ts1, ts2,  and  . The 
choice of the best single store strategy involves a trade off between the fixed plus holding cost increase (left side 
of (A5)), and the variable cost decrease (right side of (A5)) from visiting store s1 rather than s2. 
2 1 , 1 s s p I − 2 1 , 2 s s p I −
 








2 1 , s I s s II TC TC < −
Whether these conditions hold depends on the levels of   and  .  2 1 , 1 s s p I − 2 1 , 2 s s p I −
If  ,  and I 0 2 1 , 1 > −s s p I 0 2 1 , 2 > −s s p I p1,s1-s2 ≠ Ip2, s1-s2, the total variable costs for strategy II hold the middle 
between those for the single store s1 and the single store s2 strategy: 
1 , 2 2 1 , 1 1 1 , 2 , 2 , 2 2 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 2
1 , 1 , 2 , 1 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 2 , 2 2 2 , 1 1
) 1 (
) 1 (
s p p s p p s p II s p p s p II s p p
s p II s p p s p II s p p s p p s p p
VC D VC D VC D VC D
VC D VC D VC D VC D
+ > − +




  41The total fixed plus holding costs for the multiple store strategy will certainly exceed those of store s2 when 
visited alone:  
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yet they may be lower than those for the single strategy with store s1 
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if the category with the higher holding cost potential (say, e.g. category p2) is less strongly preferred in the store 
with the higher unit fixed cost : Dp2 Sp2> Dp1 Sp1 and  2 1 , 1 2 1 , 2 s s p s s p I I − − < with ts1>ts2. In this case, the increase in 
total variable costs (from transferring part of the basket to store s2), may be more than compensated by the 
reduction in total fixed plus holding costs (by visiting the low unit fixed cost store s2 for purchases of the 
category with the weakest store preference for s1). This completes the proof of result 2b.  
 
Proof of result 3a: Let stores be such that s1 is preferred for category p1 ( ) and s2 for p2 
( ).  
0 2 1 , 1 > −s s p I
0 2 1 , 2 < −s s p I
 
We first consider the case with equal unit fixed costs (ts1 = ts2=t).  
 
⇒ Comparing the two single store strategies with one another, we see from Table 1 that the consumer will 
select store s1 if  
1 , 2 2 1 , 1 1 2 , 2 2 2 , 1 1 s p p s p p s p p s p p VC D VC D VC D VC D + > +  
and store s2 in the opposite case.  
 
⇒ Comparing the single store strategies with the multiple store strategies leads to the following insights. The 
single store strategies will imply lower total fixed plus holding costs than any of the multiple store alternatives. 
Indeed, with ts1=ts2=t <ts1s2, we have: 
) ( 2 2 2 1 1 p p p p D S D S t +  
) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ( 2 ) ( 2
2
1 , 2 , 2 2
2
1 , 1 , 1 1
2
1 , 2 , 2 2 1 , 1
2
, 1 1 s p II p p s p II p p s p II p p s p II p p D S D S t D S D S t α α α α − + − + + <
) ( 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 p p p p s s D S D S t + <  
 
where the comparisons are those with patterns II, and III, resp.  
However, as the two stores are preference complements, patronizing both stores will allow to reduce total 
variable shopping costs. So, the selection of a single or a multiple store strategy depends on a trade off between 
lower total fixed plus holding costs, and lower total variable costs, resp. 
 
⇒ Comparing the costs of strategies II and III, we find that as long as category p1 is preferred in store s1 and p2 
in s2, the total variable costs of strategy II are higher than those of strategy III: 
) 1 (
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However, the total fixed plus holding costs of strategy II, given by: 
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may or may not be lower than those of the combined strategy: 
) ( 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 p p p p s s D S D S t +  
depending on how category purchases are spread across the separate store visits. Hence, the selection between 
strategies II and III comes down to a trade off between (possibly) higher total fixed plus holding costs (for the 
combined strategy III) and higher total variable costs (for the separate store strategy II).  
  42So, with category preference complementarity and equal unit fixed costs, none of the three shopping strategies 
(single store, multiple store-separate and multiple store-combined) can be ruled out a priori. 
 
Second, in the more general case where the stores’ unit fixed costs differ, the motives for selecting single, 
separate or combined strategies become a mixture of the motives underlying result 2 (no category preference 
complementarity and different unit fixed costs) and those described above (category preference 
complementarity and the same unit fixed cost). Introducing differences in unit fixed costs in the expressions 
above will reinforce the appeal of strategy II if the category with the higher holding cost potential is preferred in 
the store with the lower unit fixed cost. Conversely, if the category with the higher Sp1Dp1 is preferred in the 
high unit fixed cost store, the single (I) and combined (III) shopping patterns become relatively more appealing. 
 
 
Appendix 3. Aligning category purchase allocations and store visit timing 
 
To illustrate the ‘alignment’ problem with separate store visits, and several categories purchased in different 
stores, consider the following example.  
Let Ns1=1, and Ns2=2. Assume (like in the simulations) that there are three categories, for which the 
independently optimal allocations (based on [A2]) amount to α1,s2= 0.25, α2,s2= 0.5 and α3,s2= 0.75. It is easy to 
see that these optima are not reconcilable. Indeed, for category 1, visits to store s2 would have to take place as 
follows : if a visit to s1 occurs at time t=0, then store s2 would be visited at time .75 (=1-α1,s2 ) and .875 (store 
s2 visits being uniformly spread over the remaining period α1,s2 =.25, hence with inter-visit interval of .25/ 
Ns2=.125). For category 2, however, of which a larger portion is bought in store s2, the first visit to s2 would 
have to occur at time .50 already, and the second at time .75.  Store timing for category 3 , finally, would require 
visits to s2 at time .25 and .625. Obviously, as long as Ns2=2, these patterns are not reconcilable.  
We hypothesize that, to align store visit patterns across categories (and adjust purchase allocations accordingly), 
the consumer considers one of two options. 
 
A first possibility is to let the most ‘restrictive’ category (of which most is bought in store s2) determine the 
timing of store s2 visits. In our example, this would be category 3. In that case, adjustments will have to be 
made to the purchase spread of categories 1 and 2. For these categories, the following options remain: 
(i)  buy enough in store s1 to get by till the next visit to s2, then buy equal amounts on each visit to s2. 
This would come down to an allocation similar to that of category 3, with .25 of category needs bought 
in s1,  
(ii)  skip one visit to s2, that is, buy enough in store s1 to last till the second visit to store s2, then purchase 
the remaining portion in store s2 on this second visit. The units bought in s1 would then have to cover 
a period equal to (1-α3,s2 ) + α3,s2/ Ns2, where the first term represents time till the first visit to s2, the 
second term time between the first and the second visit to s2, leading to an ‘adjusted’ allocation to 
store s1 of  0.625.  
(iii)  skip two visits to s2 which, in our example, results in purchasing everything from store s1  
Which adjustment is optimal for category 1 and 2, will depend on the revised acquisition cost associated with 
the adjusted allocation, plus the revised holding cost implied by it. For category 2, the competing options seem 
to be (i) and (ii), while for category 1, options (ii) and (iii) are the best candidates. Note that – given Ns1=1 - the 
holding cost for the second option now comes down to (1-α3,s1)
2 Sp Dp/(2*(Ns2-1))+(α3,s1)
2 Sp Dp/(2), where the 
denominator of the first term indicates that one visit to store s2 is skipped. 
 
A second possibility is that the consumer, in revising his allocation, determines a ‘jointly optimal’ alpha for all 
categories bought in store s2. (Such an alpha would be obtained by setting the derivative of the acquisition plus 
holding costs for categories 1 to 3 to zero, with respect to a joint alpha s1, similar to the step in Appendix 1.1. 
The formula is given below).  
For instance, such a joint alpha for store s1 could amount to .4 (implying an alpha of .6 for store s2), in which 
case visits to store s2 would occur at time .4 and .7. For each of the three categories, and using a similar logic as 
before, the options would now be to 
(i)  allocate .4 to store s1, and spread the remaining .6  over the two visits to s2 
(ii)  allocate .7 to store s1, skip the first visit to s2, and purchase the remaining .3 on the last visit to s2 
(iii)  buy everything in store s1 
Again, for each product category, the best of these options will determine the adjusted purchase allocation for 
that category. 
 
  43The consumer will then settle for the heuristic (either let the most restrictive category, or the joint alpha, 
determine store timing) that yields the lowest total cost. 
 
In general, we adopt the following ‘procedure’ in our simulations. Let Ns1 be the number of visits to store s1, 
and Ns2 (> Ns1) the number of visits to s2, per period. Based on equation [A2], let the (unadjusted) category 
allocations be such that αp,s1<1 for a subset of categories (in set Q1) and αp,s1=1 for the remaining categories. 
We need to decide upon one (common) timing for the visits to store s2 (between subsequent visits to s1). 
Moreover, for all p in Q1, we need to adjust the levels of αp,s1 such that they are consistent with this store timing. 
Our procedure comprises the following steps: 
(1) For all categories in set Q1: determine a ‘common αs2 –candidate’ : α
c
s2. Time visits to store s2 as 
follows: The first visit occurs (1-α
c
s2 )/Ns1 periods after store s1 is visited, followed by (Ns2/Ns1) –1 
visits with inter-trip time of α
c
s2 /(Ns2) 
(2) For each category in set Q1: 




s2) +x (Ns1/Ns2) α
c
s2 ∈[0, 1]. Note that x 
represents the number of visits to store s2 that are ‘skipped’, see also the example above. 
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(3) Sum TCp across categories. 
 
(4)  Repeat this procedure for the following αs2 –candidates’:  
•  The maximum over categories in Q1, of their  unadjusted αp,s2 
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and select the ‘common αs2 –candidate’ that yields the lowest ΣpTCp. Implement the associated levels of 
α
c
p,s1 and timing of visits to s2. 
 
If Ns2=Ns1, repeat the procedure replacing s1 by s2. Then, select the adjusted strategy with the lowest ΣpTCp.
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